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ABSTRACT
The expected future impact of the fourth industrial revolution is a hotly debated issue in the literature.
The majority of papers focus on quantifying the expected impacts on labour demand, or on a specific
country, or on huge macro-regions – and the estimates differ widely. Our paper focuses on the impact
assessment of Industry 4.0 on the expected structure of employment, wages and inequalities in Hungary.
We built a static microsimulation model for our analysis, where the “EU Survey of Income and Living
Conditions Hungary 2017” dataset was used as a starting point. Projections by the European Centre for
the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) were used for policy simulations on future
employment by sector and by occupational group for each European Union (EU) member state. The
analysis also elaborates our own augmented vision about the expected labour demand changes and
expected wage trends. Based on this information, the spill-over effects were calculated regarding wage
structure and inequalities by sector, region and the highest educational attainment.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Industrial revolutions usually lead to a huge polarisation of wealth and power, followed by
several measures, including taxation, development of social safety nets and actions by trade
unions, to offset the harmful consequences (WEF 2016). Regarding the fourth industrial rev-
olution, the expected changes and challenges are so profound that it is crucial to prepare both
economic policy decision-makers and employers for absorbing the new ways of thinking and the
new speed of innovation changes (Landmann – Heumann 2016; Verhofstadt 2017). The future
is happening right now (Wike – Stokes 2018), and we have to cope with new types of challenges
and be prepared for them. But, for that, a lot of information is needed (Deloitte 2019; SZTAKI
2018).
Therefore, it is essential to elaborate models for policy analysis to produce credible evidence
to answer questions that policy makers care about: What could the future of work and labour
market look like?; How can the distributional effects be quantified; and What will be the most
important implications of the development process as a whole?
In order to support this, the paper provides estimates on the expected labour market impacts
and the distributional effects of automation for Hungary until the year 2030. We have built a
microsimulation model where we took into consideration both the population projections from
both the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (CEDEFOP) and the
Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO), which differ quite sharply in terms of assumptions
on net migration to Hungary. Regarding labour supply, we used the assumption that size and
structure of the labour supply would be unchanged or it could even deteriorate due to the
rigidness in the education system and also due to the fact that the different structures of
migration inflows and outflows in terms of educational levels are not favourable for Hungary. It
can be also argued that the relationship between the education system and labour supply
structure is vague and can only be transformed on the longer run. Regarding future demand for
labour by sector and occupation, we used the CEDEFOP (CEDEFOP 2018) forecasts for 2030.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the current liter-
ature, taking into consideration the unavoidable megatrends as well as the country-specific
aspects. Section 3 describes the main characteristics of the microsimulation dataset and also
gives a brief overview of the demographic trends and the different demographic scenarios used
in the analysis, as well as their consequences for the size and structure of Hungarian labour
demand and supply. In Section 4, the main assumptions for the labour demand and real wages
are presented at sectoral level, and the main results of the different scenarios are shown, followed
by concluding remarks.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND SOME SPECIFIC ISSUES OF THE
HUNGARIAN CASE
Microsimulation modelling is a micro-based methodology that can be used for the analysis of
micro-units such as individuals, households or corporations. This micro-based simulation
modelling technique originated from Orcutt (1960), but the spread of microsimulation meth-
odology was quite limited until the early 1990s due to lack of computer capacities and insuf-
ficient accessibility of micro-data. Economic microsimulation models can be categorized as static
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or dynamic. Static models take the characteristics of individuals (gender, age, family type,
employment status, etc.) as exogenous, while dynamic models try to follow the evolution of these
characteristics one-by-one either through behavioural responses or pre-determined rules.
Static microsimulation models, where the temporal dimension and behavioural response
elements are excluded, are more widely used in social sciences. These models focus on the day-
after impacts and concentrate mainly on distributional effects of possible (mainly fiscal) policy
changes (Sutherland 1995). It can be an important question for economic policy decision makers
on how incomes or living conditions of certain social groups change in response to certain
government measures. At first, some national static tax-benefit models were elaborated (Bitler
et al. 2006; Wagenhals 2004) and the relevant microsimulation techniques were discussed for
impact assessment of fiscal policies (Bitler et al. 2006; Bourguignon – Spadaro 2006). For the
specific case of Hungary, Szıvos et al. (1998) applied a static microsimulation model (TARSZIM)
for the analysis of taxes and benefits. After the EU enlargement in 2004, microsimulation tools
were increasingly applied in Central and Eastern Europe for analysing the effectiveness of
planned or already implemented economic policy measures (Benedek – Kiss 2011; Benedek –
Lelkes 2006; Cserhati et al. 2007; Gupta – Kapur 2000). EUROMOD, the official tax-benefit
microsimulation model of the EU, went one step further, allowing some international com-
parisons across different EU countries regarding the impacts of taxes and benefits on the dis-
tribution and composition of incomes (Atkinson 2009; Paulus et al. 2009; Sutherland – Figari
2013).
The analysis of income inequalities in Hungary by microsimulation techniques has become
widespread during and after the great recession (Cserhati et al. 2012; Cserhati – Takacs 2010),
and the possible distributional impacts of a flat-rate income tax system were also analysed by
Benedek and Kiss (2011).
Data reliability is of crucial importance for a microsimulation model for policymaking.
Generally, microsimulation models use micro-level surveys (household budget or income sur-
veys, etc.) as primary sources. However, consistency had to be created among micro-data
collected from the survey and macro-data taken from other sources if one aims to use the model
results for actual decision making. Data issues and the methodology of solving these issues were
overviewed in some papers (Bargain –Callan 2010; Cserhati – Keresztely 2012), and Bourgui-
gnon et al. (2008) presented a comprehensive array of macro–micro modelling frameworks,
which combine macro-models with microsimulation models. Colombo (2010) also showed an
overview of different linking approaches focussing on connecting Computable General Equi-
librium (CGE) and microsimulation models, allowing to take into consideration the general
equilibrium effects of a proposed fiscal policy change. Peichl (2009) also analysed the benefits
and problems of linking micro- and macro-models. Based on these methodological de-
velopments, impact assessments of longer term development or structural reforms on the labour
market have become possible. Norton (2017) explored the ways in which the fourth industrial
revolution can affect developing countries and their income distribution. Cserhati and Takacs
(2018) analysed the expected labour market impacts of automation and its impact on the
poverty gap. It was concluded that technological development without targeted policy measures
can increase both inequality and poverty, quite significantly.
This paper focuses on the impacts of automation on the labour market and on the possible
spillover effects regarding income distribution and expected inequality trends. We use the static
microsimulation modelling approach, simulating the expected labour market movements by
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reweighting the micro-dataset. Based on the assumptions on demographic movements and
sector-level labour demand and supply discrepancies, several income and income inequality
measures can be calculated (by region, the highest educational attainment, sector, etc.). By
applying this method, a static microsimulation model can be a useful tool for analysing long-
term inequality impacts of different macroeconomic scenarios regarding technological devel-
opment and the expected changes in forms and structure of employment, i.e. the future of work.
The three industrial revolutions recorded in history so far exerted a direct and immediate
effect, typically within the industry. However, changes experienced today in the industrial field
have presumably been driven by partly independent, self-learning technology with memory,
inspired by the fast development of digital technology. To adapt to this development, an
increasingly open and flexible institutional system is necessary that has an effect on many fields,
even beyond industry, in areas like social and economic cooperation.
One of these social institutions is the labour market, where there is a consensus that a well-
functioning labour market promotes innovation. Companies aiming at innovation can grasp the
opportunities of training adjusted to the needs of simplified labour hiring and dismissal offered
by the labour market. Selection of appropriate labour is facilitated by applying big data pro-
cedures (Isson – Harriott 2016).
Two key factors should be highlighted in the context of implementing an efficient
employment policy. First, essential condition in the deliberate influencing of labour market
processes is transparency, i.e. to have adequate short-, medium- and long-term labour market
forecasts on the supply and demand side alike. The second condition is the establishment and
efficient operation of an institutional system designed for the treatment of unemployment (Pirisi
2017).
For the sake of drawing up the most accurate labour market prognoses possible, the literature
has paid special attention to the topic of Industry 4.0, commensurate with its weight (F€ul€op
2018). Part of the technical literature draws attention to the structural changes of labour demand
due to the expected technological development in a given country, considering its demographic
situation, economic structure and role in the international division of labour or in a broader
outlook (Acemoglu – Restrepo 2019). Another part of literature tries to foresee more specific
labour market effects. Some of these contributions are pessimistic concerning the expected la-
bour demand. For example, a paper in this category applies estimation and statistical modelling
to come to the conclusion that 47% of today’s jobs would be lost with a probability higher than
70% in the USA (Frey – Osborn 2013). Another paper investigating the economic role of in-
dustry in Europe found that employees with low qualifications would be the most affected by the
disappearance of industrial jobs. The number of employees with higher qualifications show an
increasing tendency (Rodrik 2016). An analysis examining the OECD countries using secondary
data analysis found that an average 9% of jobs could be automated in these countries (Arntz
et al. 2016). A research group commissioned by the World Bank performing corporate data
analysis found (based on production and import data from the US, China and Mexico) that the
use of a new robot reduces the population-proportional employment by 0.18–0.34% and average
wages by 0.25–0.5%.
At the same time, according to a macro-simulation study (Cette et al. 2016), if less strict
labour regulations were introduced in the EU, the share of employees with higher qualification
would decrease within the total headcount of those in employment faster than the rate of in-
crease of those with low schooling. The first would decrease by around 13% in Germany and
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Austria and by 23% in France. The driver of this development is the appearance of the relatively
higher cost-savings generated by the dismissal of those with higher schooling, as extra invest-
ment funds providing an opportunity for the replacement of a higher proportion of those with
higher qualification.
As for Hungary, according to analysis based on corporate surveys and focussing on jobs
replaceable by automation, about 500 thousand jobs are estimated to be lost (Nabelek et al.
2016). There are several other rather pessimistic views in the literature regarding the Hungarian
case such as Fine et al. (2018), who firmly argued that half of the working hours in Hungary
would be done by robots.
A paper presenting more optimistic findings examined 46 countries of different development
levels and came to the conclusion that career changes affecting 3–14% of the labour force would
be needed (McKinsey 2017). It has also examined the percentage of industrial jobs by country
that could be automated and showed that 26% for Japan and 5% for Kenya are the two extreme
ratios. Further optimistic studies have also been released, one of which is the analysis of the
World Economic Forum (WEF 2016), based on corporate surveys and covering 1.86 billion
sample of employees in 15 countries. It was found that 2 million new and 7–10 million
terminated jobs are to be expected in those countries. The analysis of Tuomisto (2016), based on
secondary data analysis and a global approach, came to the conclusion that a significant part of
jobs would be transformed, and to ensure the best possible technological adaptation and least
social shock, more colourful and democratic organisations should evolve. Berger (2016) also
studied the possible changes in Western Europe, using labour market modelling and assuming
that Industry 4.0 solutions would have a proliferation rate of 50% by 2035. The analysis
concluded that the number of industrial employees would first increase, then decrease. On the
whole, there will be 1.4 million new jobs in Europe. But other jobs would also be affected, so 10
million new jobs would emerge, 70% of these are among service companies.
The literature of the past years indicated very different rates and structures for the direct and
indirect employment effects of Industry 4.0 (Mckinsey 2017; Acemoglu – Restrepo 2019). This
phenomenon does not refer to the changes over time concerning a specific country only, but also
to the diversity of expectations by region. Projection is made more difficult by the fact that the
long-term trends of employment are highly similar in various regions, depending on their
economic development levels. The share of industry and construction fluctuates slightly, the
share of agriculture diminishes, and the weight of services increases (Piketty 2014). Table 1
Table 1. Number of employed persons and ratio of industrial/construction employees in Hungary
(1998, 2008 and 2018)
Employed persons, total (thousands)
Employed persons in industry and
construction (thousands) Ratio
1998 3695.6 1267.3 34.3
2008 3848.3 1231.9 32
2018 4469.5 1445.9 32.3
Source: authors, based on KSH (2018).
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reflects similar developments: in Hungary, the ratio of industrial and construction employees
decreased between 1998 and 2008, and slightly increased between 2008 and 2018 (KSH 2018).
The picture is further differentiated by the fact that one of the key goals of public social
policy, and labour market policy within it, is to prevent long-term unemployment on account of
its significant potential negative social and economic effects for a given society (Frey 2007; Őry
2005). Obviously, this statement could be criticised from many perspectives, but the effect of the
– alleged or actual – problem is demonstrated by the fact that, whereas the EU currently
contributes around 19% of global GDP, its share in global social transfers is around 35% (ILO
2014). Considering the changes in public social protection expenditures compared to GDP in
the countries globally, it can be seen that they rose from 5.8 to 8.6% between 1990 and 2010,
whereas in Western Europe the corresponding figures were 20.9 and 26.7% (ILO 2014).
Under the combined effects of a social policy driven by similar intentions, a public work
programme complementing it and the increasingly perceptible labour shortage, the employment
rate of the 20–64 year-old with maximum eight-year primary education has been increasing in
Hungary, according to the data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, from 36.1% in 2010
to 53.9% in 2017.
One must not disregard the effect of the digital revolution on organisational structures.
Notably, in April 2008, Vermont was the first state in the US where a new enterprise form, the
low-profit limited liability corporation, L3C, was licensed. L3C functions as a for-profit com-
pany, generating a minimum amount of profit but geared primarily towards producing a sig-
nificant social benefit of some kind (Pink 2010).
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HUNGARIAN LABOUR MARKET
Data of from the EU’s Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for Hungary (with
the reference year of 2018) served as a basis for our microsimulation modelling. It contains
information on the employment status and income by detailed income categories on 25,000
individuals. The EU-SILC is based on the idea of a common framework consisting of common
procedures, concepts, classifications and target variables. However, the dataset is only partly
representative by sector, region and educational attainment; therefore, we also used the official
Eurostat data (Labour Force Statistics) for analysing the recent characteristics of the Hungarian
labour market and for making international comparison.
As Fig. 1 shows, the Hungarian employment structure is much more product than service
oriented than the EU average. In Hungary, one out of five employees work in industry, while in
the EU this is almost 5% points less. Employment in the service sectors (professional, scientific
activities, education, heath, etc.) is significantly lower in Hungary. These structural differences
can signal that the Hungarian labour market might face extraordinary challenges to be able to
meet the requirements of Industry 4.0 (e.g., new type of skills, new forms of work, etc.) for the
years to come.
As shown in Table 2, employment structure and employment rates vary significantly by
educational attainment between the EU and Hungary. In Hungary, only a fourth of employees
have tertiary education while it is more than one third in the EU. On the other hand, the ratio of
people with less than secondary education (ISCED levels 0–2) is much lower in Hungary than it
is in the EU on average. This could indicate a favourable position in combating the
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Figure 1. Employment (15–64 years of age) by sector, in Hungary and the EU, 2017 (as percentage of total)
Source: authors, based on Eurostat Labour Force Statistics
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consequences of the expected sharp decrease in demand for low-skilled workforce. Analysing the
employment rate figures shows that the best channel to increase the employment rate would be
to increase the ratio of employees with tertiary education. The employment rate in this category
is around 84% in the EU and Hungary, and the demand is expected to increase further for the
next decades.
4. MICROSIMULATION MODELLING: METHODOLOGY, ASSUMPTIONS AND
PROJECTION OF SPILLOVER EFFECTS
4.1. Methodology
The economic consequences of changing populations are frequently analysed. Our analysis uses
the EU-SILC micro-datasets as a starting point, which are available to researchers carrying out
statistical analyses for scientific purposes. These micro-data refer both to individuals and
households. For the analysis, we used the individual level EU-SILC Hungary 2018 dataset, where
individual data were anonymized in such a way that the statistical units could not be identified.
Our microsimulation dataset consists of all current household members aged 16 years and over,
of the EU-SILC 2018 database. The EU-SILC data collection refers to private households living
in the territory of Hungary. The personal level variables are regrouped into five domains: de-
mographic data, education, health, labour and income.
The following steps were followed during the modelling process.
1. Aging of the dataset (based on the assumed macroeconomic demographic projections). In
scenario 1, the EUROPOP baseline was applied, while in scenarios 2 and 3, the demographic
projection of HCSO Demographic Research Institute (HCSO DRI) was used. All the original
personal weights (personal cross sectional weights from the personal register file) were
modified to meet the requirement regarding the size and the structure of the Hungarian
population in 2030).
Table 2. Employment and employment rate by the highest educational attainment (from 15 to 64
years), 2017
Highest educational attainment
Employment Employment rate
EU Hungary EU Hungary
Less than primary, or primary and lower
secondary education (levels 0–2)
17.7 11.9 45.5 38.5
Upper secondary, post-secondary, or non-tertiary
education (levels 3–4)
48.0 62.3 70.9 73.1
Tertiary education (levels 5–8) 34.3 25.8 84.0 84.3
Total 100.0 100.0 67.6 68.2
Source: authors, based on Eurostat Labour Force Statistics.
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2. Uprating the microsimulation dataset taking into account the projected macroeconomic
development by 2030. In terms of uprating employment, the expected employment growth
was disaggregated by industry, and workers in dependent employment were divided into 18
categories. Specific uprating factors were applied to account for employment growth by
industry from 2018 to 2030, based on the assumptions in the different scenarios. In scenarios
1 and 2, the CEDEFOP employment projection by industry was applied to the individuals
working in a specific industry, while in scenario 3, a smaller employment growth and
different structure was projected as a consequence of the assumed skill mismatch. To uprate
the wage rates, the standard assumption is that everyone’s income from a given source
changes by the same rate over the relevant period. This would clearly be unrealistic and
would understate distributional changes. In this paper, expected earnings growth was dis-
aggregated by industry, so workers in dependent employment were also divided also into 18
categories. Specific uprating factors were applied to account for earnings growth of em-
ployees by industry from 2018 to 2030, based on the assumptions in the different scenarios of
the assumed labour-market conditions.
3. Calculating gross and net income for each individual. We adjusted the value of the gross
earnings variable for each individual based on the assumed changes in sectoral employment
and wage developments. We calculated net income for each individual in the dataset
assuming no changes in the personal income tax system (rates, tax credits, etc.) for the
forecasted period.
4. Aggregating the results by income categories (deciles), by the highest educational attainment,
by region, calculating inequality measures based on the output micro-dataset.
This widely used “top-down” microsimulation methodology facilitates the analysis of the
distributional impacts of “nowcasted” or projected macroeconomic development.
4.2. Assumptions for demographic trends in Hungary
The last Hungarian medium-term employment projection was made around ten years ago. The
2014–20 employment strategy of the government included no projections (NGM 2014). HCSO’s
Demographic Research Institute (HCSO DRI), on the other hand, draws up projections on a
regular basis (F€oldhazi 2014). According to the latest data, by 2030, Hungary will have a
population of 9,047,175, corresponding to a 9.2% decrease relative to 2017 (F€oldhazi 2015).
According to the Eurostat projection, for the same period, the population of Hungary will
change only slightly (Eurostat 2019). A difference of almost half a million people can be seen
between these two population projections, which mainly stems from the different assumptions
for migration inflows to Hungary.
Assumptions based on these sources for the applied scenarios are presented in Table 3.
In the first scenario in Table 3, we applied the official “Europop 2015” baseline projections
for Hungary. Based on this, the population of Hungary was projected to decrease at a much
lower rate (only a 2.6% decrease was projected compared to the population in 2018), which
would mean that at about 9.6 million people living in Hungary in 2030. Change in employment
is expected to be driven by the service sectors and the most popular occupations will be “office
associate professionals” and “researchers & engineers”. They also argue that the majority of total
job openings in 2030 will be for higher-level qualifications. Regarding the CEEFOP labour force
estimations, a stagnation (0.1% decrease) was projected. In terms of employment, even a very
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small increase (0.4%) was projected, mainly due to the increase in the employment rate for
persons aged more than 50 years.
In the second and third scenarios, we applied the HCSO DRI baseline population projection,
which was based on the cohort-component method, which calculates the population size by age and
sex for every successive year. In this projection (in the baseline scenario), the total fertility rate was
expected to be 1.6, while life expectancy at birth was assumed to be 75.6 years for males and 82.4
years for females (F€oldhazi 2015) by 2030. The net migration inflow was predicted negative, but only
as low as 5,960 persons. Based on these assumptions, a sharp population loss was projected by 2030
(9.05 million people, a 6% decrease from 2018 to 2030). Regarding the age structure, the share of the
young and middle-age cohorts was projected to shrink, while the number and share of older people
(above 65 years) was expected to reach 2.1 million. In other words, both the old age dependency
ratio (the ratio between the number of persons above 65 and the number of working-age persons
between 15 and 64 years) and the aging index (the ratio between the number of persons above 65
and the number of persons aged less than 15 years) was projected to deteriorate quite sharply.
We then applied different scenarios to determine the expected size and structure of Hungarian
employment. We have reweighted the dataset based on our assumptions, assigning bigger weights to
persons (records) whose job belonged to sectors with higher projected dynamics, and smaller
weights to those who work in a sector expected to shrink significantly. Then, we assumed the ex-
pected real wage changes by sector, by 2030. Finally, the expected incomes were calculated at first on
the micro-level, then aggregate results were calculated by decile, educational attainment and regions.
As a last step, we analysed the changes in inequalities and the possible social consequences.
4.3. Assumptions for the wage and employment dynamics by sector
The underlying assumptions regarding the real wage forecasts were as follows: we assumed that
sectors characterized by higher gross value added ratio (ICT services, manufacturing, etc.) would
realize a relatively higher real wage increase due to the growing labour shortage with regard to
the sectors where highly-skilled workforce is needed. On the other hand, wages in the gov-
ernment led sectors are expected to increase at a much lower rate. On the whole, we assumed a
1.5–2% annual real wage increase favouring the highly skilled flexible workforce at a significantly
higher rate. Regarding our employment forecasts, we used the two scenarios of the HCSO DRI
and CEDEFOP discussed in the previous section. The labour market consequences of these
different assumptions can be seen in Table 4.
Table 3. Economic activity of the Hungarian population, 2018–2030, in percentage change
2018 (thousand
persons)
2030 Scenario 1:
CEDEFOP projection
2030 Scenario 2:
HCSO DRI population
þ no skill mismatch
2030 Scenario 3:
HCSO DRI population
þ severe skill
mismatch
Employed 4,469.5 5.3% 2.3% 11.6%
Total population 9,778.4 0.1% 5.7% 5.7%
Source: authors, based on data from HCSO DRI and CEDEFOP (Europop 2015 baseline).
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Table 4. Future employment and real wage growth in Hungary by sector between 2018 and 2030 (%)
Scenario
1:
CEDEFOP
Scenario 2:
HCSO DRI þ
no skill
mismatch
Scenario 3:
HCSO DRI
severe skill
mismatch
Scenario
1:
CEDEFOP
Scenario 2:
HCSO DRI þ
no skill
mismatch
Scenario 3:
HCSO DRI
severe skill
mismatch
Employment Real wage growth
A – Agriculture,
forestry and
fishing
45.3 33.0 20.0 81.7 74.3 46.4
B – Mining and
quarrying
8.6 19.0 25.0 60.0 54.6 34.1
C – Manufacturing 0.9 3.0 12.0 122.0 111.0 112.6
D – Electricity, gas,
steam and air
conditioning
supply
10.4 25.0 12.0 60.0 54.6 55.4
E – Water supply;
sewerage, waste
management
and remediation
activities
17.9 5.0 11.6 75.5 68.7 69.7
F – Construction 2.9 22.0 15.0 91.0 82.8 64.6
G – Wholesale and
retail trade;
repair of motor
vehicles and
motorcycles
7.6 22.0 9.0 29.0 26.4 16.5
H – Transportation
and storage
8.5 2.0 11.6 44.5 40.5 41.1
I – Accommodation
and food service
27.4 13.0 5.0 44.5 40.5 25.3
J – Information and
communication
0.5 25.0 11.6 153.0 139.2 200.0
K – Financial and
insurance
activities
37.2 23.0 10.0 29.0 26.4 26.8
L – Real estate
activities
46.5 7.0 11.6 29.0 26.4 16.5
(continued)
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4.4. Projections and main findings
Figure 2 shows the results of our impact assessment for the income distributions by decile in
2018 (base) and for 2030. It can be seen that all the three scenarios show a significant increase in
inequality compared to the state of 2018. Scenarios 1 and 2 (CEDEFOP projection and HCSO
DRI projection with no skill mismatch) show a similar evolution of inequalities, but the third
scenario shows a significantly different picture: only situation of the richest two deciles improves
significantly, while the relative income position of all other deciles deteriorates. While the in-
come share of the poorest 20% was 6.4% in 2018, it is projected to decrease to 5% for 2030 in
scenario 3. This scenario indicates that the skill mismatch can be the real problem in 2030, since
the higher labour shortage may result in larger wage differentiation and this will lead to higher
income polarisation irrespective of the extent of immigration.
Table 5 shows no or just small changes in the distribution of employed people by the highest
educational attainment. The distribution of different educational attainment levels was calcu-
lated by reweighting based on the assumed employment trends. No major structural change in
Table 4. Continued
Scenario
1:
CEDEFOP
Scenario 2:
HCSO DRI 
no skill
mismatch
Scenario 3:
HCSO DRI
severe skill
mismatch
Scenario
1:
CEDEFOP
Scenario 2:
HCSO DRI 
no skill
mismatch
Scenario 3:
HCSO DRI
severe skill
mismatch
Employment Real wage growth
M – Professional,
scientific and
technical
activities
46.5 20.0 11.4 44.5 40.5 200.0
N – Administrative
and support
service activities
5.2 9.0 11.6 29.0 26.4 16.5
O – Public
administration
and defence;
compulsory
social security
3.7 25.0 18.0 13.5 12.3 7.7
P – Education 15.5 1.0 8.0 13.5 12.3 12.5
Q – Human health
and social work
activities
33.7 50.0 4.0 29.0 26.4 26.8
R – Arts,
entertainment
and recreation
11.0 0.0 8.0 13.5 12.3 9.6
Source: authors, based on HCSO DRI and CEDEFOP.
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the educational distribution was taken into account. It does not mean that structural changes
would not be necessary in the Hungarian educational system corresponding to the needs of the
Hungarian labour market; it just shows that the expected changes in labour demand do not
generate the necessary changes automatically. The demand for high-skilled workforce will
definitely increase in the majority of sectors, therefore, active economic policy tools would be
needed to generate the labour supply with necessary skills and educational attainment. A
Figure 2. Income distribution of the employed by decile, 2018 and 2030 (Employee cash or near cash
income, in percentage of total income)
Source of data: authors, based on data from EU-SILC Hungary
Table 5. Distribution of employed people by the highest educational attainment, 2018 and 2030 (in
percentage of total employed)
Highest education attainment
Primary education Secondary education Tertiary education
2018 13.3 62.3 24.5
Scenario 1: CEDEFOP projection (2030) 12.5 61.4 26.1
Scenario 2: HCSO DRI population þ no
skill mismatch (2030)
12.2 62.0 25.7
Scenario 3: HCSO DRI population þ
severe skill mismatch (2030)
13.0 62.4 24.6
Source of data: authors, based on data from EU-SILC Hungary.
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positive outcome can emerge if higher demand towards high-skilled workers, associated with
higher income, decreases the emigration of high-skilled employees.
In 2018, average employee cash or near cash income was 15% higher in Central Hungary
than the Hungarian average. Figure 3 also shows that some moderate territorial restructuring is
projected by each scenario. The positive wage advantage is expected to increase in Central
Hungary only in the third scenario, while positions of Central and Western Transdanubia are
projected to improve in all the three scenarios. Unfortunately, the most disadvantaged regions
(Northern Hungary, Northern and Southern Great Plain) are not expected to catch up just
because the sectoral labour demand changes.
In Table 6, we summarize the spill-over effects of the simulated labour market changes on
income and income inequality changes. The median income is projected to grow significantly in
each scenario, but the increase is a bit more dynamic in the first scenario (EUROPOP projection
with no skill mismatch), where a more advanced adjustment of labour supply to the new re-
quirements was assumed as a result of implementing a more developed lifelong learning system
and some other active labour market policy tools. It can also be seen that income inequalities are
Figure 3. Employee cash or near cash income (gross) by region, 2018 and 2030 (national average 5 100)
Table 6. Evolution of different measures of inequality in Hungary, 2018–2030
S80/S20 Gini Median income
Base 2018 6.5 0.333 2,094,103
Scenario 1: CEDEFOP projection 2030 8.2 0.371 3,280,829
Scenario 2: HCSO DRI population þ no skill
mismatch
2030 8.1 0.368 3,217,528
Scenario 3: HCSO DRI population þ severe
skill mismatch
2030 9.2 0.393 3,102,879
Source of data: authors, based on data from EU-SILC Hungary.
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expected to increase in each scenario irrespectively of the different assumptions about the future
demographic trends, and about the different equilibrium/non-equilibrium situations on the
labour market. However, the most significant changes were calculated in scenario 3, where we
projected a significant labour shortage of high-skilled workers and a larger wage differentiation
due this tendency. In this scenario, the income quantile share ratio would increase by almost
50%, and the Gini coefficient would come close to 0.4. To avoid this unfavourable and un-
sustainable prospect for the future, smart, intense and effective economic policy steps should be
taken to help preparing the labour force for the challenges in the future labour market.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper focused on quantifying the indirect spill-over effects of the expected sectoral
changes in labour demand in Hungary up to 2030. We elaborated three scenarios: two were
based on the official demographic projections of HCSO DRI, while the remaining one used the
latest CEDEFOP employment forecasts. In scenario 2, we assumed that the labour supply by
sector, occupation and the highest educational attainment would change significantly by 2030
(by implementing new incentives and initiatives by the government) and in this way, severe
skill mismatches could be avoided in the future labour market. In scenario 3, we assumed no
significant changes in the Hungarian education system and in labour market policy. Wage
forecasts by sector, based on the specific demand-supply estimations, were determined in each
scenario. Then the spill-over effects of the expected labour demand changes on the average
wage levels and inequalities by sector, region and the highest educational attainment were
calculated.
The results indicate that structural labour demand changes could cause a moderate in-
come polarisation in scenarios 1 and 2. In these cases, the regional inequalities are expected to
remain more or less stable but significant. It is quite an interesting and a bit unexpected result
that the increase in inequalities is quite similar and limited in these scenarios, i.e. irrespective
of the assumptions concerning the size of the net migration. In scenario 3, we assumed that
the preparation for the “future of work” will not be perfectly smooth in Hungary. Restruc-
turing of the Hungarian labour market is on the horizon, but the speed of structural changes
in skills, occupations and increase in the ratio of people with tertiary education is not suf-
ficient yet. Based on our calculations in scenario 3, we argue that the most important chal-
lenge for Hungary is not only to cope with the consequences of the new labour demand by
sector, but also to establish a new labour market equilibrium in terms of sectors and skill
level, giving the opportunities for people to get the new skills and necessary knowledge.
Otherwise, the significant skill mismatches could cause severe problems in the labour market,
decreasing long-term economic growth prospects and inducing significant income polar-
isation due to the larger wage gaps and higher unemployment rates. Based on our micro-
simulation results, it can be concluded that the most important challenges for employees,
employers and especially for the government are mainly connected to the country’s perfor-
mance regarding preparation for the future of work. Surprisingly to the demographic chal-
lenges regarding aging and migration for Hungarian economy by 2030 matter much less. As a
consequence, it can be argued that new initiatives regarding life-long learning, programs
supporting more flexible workplaces, government measures supporting digitalization and
further development of the Hungarian tertiary education system could be of vital importance
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regarding longer term economic growth, and also it could help to avoid unsustainable income
inequality trends in Hungary.
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